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SPECIAL ISSUE
New Transatlantic Tension and the Kagan Phenomenon:
A Primer
By Craig Smith*

A. Introduction
A dark cloud appears to have settled over the northern Atlantic. With regard to
fostering international security, consensus-based cooperation between Europe and
the United States seems overshadowed by tension, divisiveness, and uncertainty.
This must dismay anyone who believes that even-handed cooperation would yield
more peaceful prosperity than uncoordinated, competitive efforts.
What has caused this disheartening cloud, and how might we remove it? To ask
such questions effectively, we need patience and courage: patience because the
answers may be tremendously complex, courage because the opinions expressed
tend to be unsettling. We thus may be tempted to remain within our comfort zone:
to reject hastily, or to ignore unwisely, challenges to favored assumptions. To examine today’s transatlantic relationship effectively, therefore, we need open hearts
and minds.
Openness is especially important when we discuss the controversial, attentiongrabbing thesis of former U.S. Department of State official Robert Kagan. In June
2002, Kagan, who is now a fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, 1 published “Power and Weakness.” This article presciently described a
deep, enduring mid-Atlantic political rift.2 Kagan’s analysis generated much discussion in the U.S. and Europe and quickly became required reading for observers
of relations between these traditional allies and sometimes rivals.3 Moreover, be*
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cause of the article’s popularity, an enhanced version of it appeared in February
2003 as the now-popular book “Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the
New World Order.” I will briefly to describe Kagan’s influential thesis and offer a
few comments about it.
B. Kagan’s Call for an End to Pretense
Kagan’s first sentence, in his article and his book, asked readers to “stop pretending” that Europeans and Americans “occupy the same world.”4 Europeans occupy
a “paradise” within the European Union’s borders, Kagan wrote. Americans, by
contrast, occupy “the jungle”: an anarchic, “Hobbesian” world where law is unreliable and only military might can provide security and promote a liberal order.5
Hence the U.S. remains outside paradise’s gates, geographically west of the EU but
conceptually east of Eden.
This placement of Americans and Europeans in different worlds is literally absurd.
But figuratively it is powerful. Our “world” is typically less a geographic entity
than a collection of our perceptions about ourselves, our neighbors, and our collective social situation. Early in 2003 most Americans perceived themselves to live in
a world in which Iraq appeared sufficiently threatening to justify war. This was not
the world most Europeans perceived. They saw a world in which U.S. bombs and
soldiers promised more harm than good, while multilateral diplomacy and application of international law promised the best hope of humane, effective maintenance
of long-term security and prosperity. Accordingly, they voiced strong opposition
as the U.S. moved inexorably toward risking its soldiers and investing a huge sum
of money in a conquest and “regime change” that extremely few Europeans believed was necessary, sensible, or morally defensible. Nonetheless, U.S. Secretary
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld excoriated “Old Europe” for its unwillingness to fight,
and the U.S. military conquered Iraq largely on its own. The gaping “transatlantic
divide” Kagan had recently described was painfully laid bare.
C. Kagan’s Thesis
Kagan provocatively diagnosed causes for the rancorous European and American
disparity in worldviews. The causes of a widening transatlantic rift, Kagan as-
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serted, are disparity in (1) military power and (2) experience with successful multilateral, nonmilitary creation of lasting peace from the ashes of war.
First, the title of Kagan’s article was shorthand for what he deemed the decisive
difference between Americans and Europeans: America’s military power versus
Europe’s military weakness. Power, meaning mainly military power, is “the allimportant question,” Kagan wrote.6 Americans have it, while Europeans do not.
Moreover, this “vast” disparity of power intellectually situates Americans and
Europeans in very different places, from which they “naturally” disagree on international security issues.7 On the one hand, the Cold War’s threat from the Soviet
Union has subsided. New threats – so-called rogue states and terrorism – have
proven exceptionally difficult to perceive, quantify, and manage. Americans and
Europeans have judged these threats quite differently, Kagan argued, partly because states and groups hostile to Western beliefs and behavior target the U.S. more
than Europe. They do so largely because the American military giant has guaranteed the security of the European military “pygmy.”
On the other hand, Kagan added, American military predominance has fostered
among Europeans a “psychology of weakness.”8 Contrast two scenarios of a man
near a prowling bear in a forest, Kagan asked his readers. In a European scenario,
the man’s only weapon is a knife. This European’s relative weakness would psychologically predispose him to see only “a tolerable danger,” Kagan reasoned, because hiding from the bear presents less risk than attacking it.9 By contrast, in Kagan’s American scenario the man carries a rifle. This American’s relative power
would predispose him to perceive not only a risk of “being mauled to death,” Kagan argued, but also a means to end the danger rather easily.10
Second, the transatlantic rift also has arisen from disparity in experience with successful multilateralism and supranational governance. Through the EU in particular, Europeans have experienced the substitution of successful multilateral cooperation and supranational governance for disastrous politics based primarily on military might. They know firsthand how supranational, nonmilitary cooperation can
produce peace among former enemies. Americans, Kagan asserted, do not. They
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to the contrary “have no experience of promoting ideals successfully without power.”11 Europeans also tend to believe that the EU’s accomplishment, which Kagan
justly calls a miracle worth celebrating, provides models for multilateral, nonmilitary conflict prevention and resolution beyond Europe. But again Americans do not.
Nor should they, Kagan suggested, because Europe’s miracle was artificial. It depended and still depends on U.S. military protection of Europe. That truth is exceptionally difficult to accept, Kagan added, because it undercuts Europeans’ values and ideals. After World War II left Europe in shambles, the EU gave Europeans a new, civil mission: promoting peaceful, prosperous coexistence through
nonmilitary means. The willingness of the U.S. to use military force unilaterally,
Kagan concludes, gravely threatens that mission.12
Kagan’s book, published in February 2003, presented this two-part thesis with a bit
more tact and explanation than his article had. The added tact is apparent above all
from the book’s less martial title, “Of Paradise and Power.” This contrasts U.S.
power not with Europe’s weakness but instead with the EU’s realm of peaceful,
supranational. The book also better explains why Kagan calls the EU a paradise.
Former enemies coexist prosperously there, “freed from the laws and even the
mentality of power politics.” Figuratively but decisively walled off from anarchy
by a U.S. military guarantee, Europeans enjoy “the Kantian world of perpetual
peace.”13 Their heady experience of reconciliation and peaceful, supranational governance, Kagan wrote, have made them justifiably idealistic about international
relations.14 By contrast, Americans’ powerful experience of a heretofore unthinkably devastating terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, further reduced their trust
in and patience with multilateral action within structures such as the United Nations. Europeans have grown more trusting of international law and governance,
while Americans have grown less so. “One of the things that most clearly divides
Europeans and Americans,” Kagan summarized, “is a philosophical, even metaphysical disagreement over where exactly mankind stands on the continuum
between the laws of the jungle and the laws of reason. Americans do not believe
we are as close to the realization of the Kantian dream [of perpetual peace] as do
Europeans.”15
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Finally, Kagan’s book also added a provocative question: “Is it still the West?” –
that is, should we still consider the U.S. and Europe to form a vital, coherent partnership as they did during the Cold War?16 Kagan strongly suggested a negative
answer. The familiar concept of “the West” has at least lost much relevance, Kagan
wrote. Neither Europe nor the U.S. focuses now on standing firmly together along
the western border of a threatening Soviet bloc. Europeans focus instead primarily
on further integrating and expanding the EU, while the U.S. focuses on fighting
threats that now appear able and likely to “overleap” all allies to strike directly at
U.S. territory.17
D. Kagan’s Recommendations
Kagan did not end with his armchair psychoanalysis of Europeans and his description of American disregard for Europe’s mission of building a peaceful world on a
foundation of multilateral, nonmilitary cooperation.18 These were provocative
enough. Yet Kagan really turned heads with his recommendations. Europe should
increase its military strength, “move beyond fear and anger” at the U.S., and recall
“the vital necessity of having a strong America.”19 The U.S., for its part, should
“draw Europe into common battle” in the “jungle” where rules of international law
offer little protection.20 The U.S. also should refuse to view European opinions as a
constraint on U.S. action, Kagan wrote. Of course the U.S. should respect Europeans’ political accomplishments and sensibilities. The U.S. also should honor multilateralism and the rule of law generally. Americans should do so, however, primarily for two purposes: first, to show “generosity of spirit” and thereby foster common understanding with Europeans; and, second, to gather “political capital for
those moments when multilateralism is impossible and unilateral action unavoidable.”21 At those times in particular, Kagan wrote, the U.S. must live by a double
standard. That is, it must violate the rules of international law that it otherwise,
like Europeans, seeks to strengthen.

16
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E. Comments
Kagan’s analysis deserves much of the criticism it is attracting. Some of Kagan’s
reasoning failed to rise above America-centric platitudes. For example, one section
of the book is modestly entitled “The World America Made.” This section boldly
proclaimed that “today’s Europe … is very much the product of American foreign
policy ….”22 This assertion seems overblown and unhelpful. Even if the EU might
not have arisen without an American military commitment to protect Europe, we
must not thoughtlessly pretend that the U.S. created today’s Europe. Such a suggestion belittles the Europeans’ accomplishment and undercuts Kagan’s crucial
assertion that Europeans produced the miracle of the EU and thereby gained decisively different experiences from Americans. The suggestion also undermines the
credibility of Kagan’s stated desire to improve mutual understanding.
In addition, both Kagan’s article and his book ended with this admonition: “a little
common understanding” between Americans and Europeans would “go a long
way.” That statement seems to amount to little more than an appeal for U.S. officials to exercise more tact – to show less arrogance and more “generosity of spirit”
and “respect for the opinion of mankind.”23 Officials such as Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld create fertile ground for such advice. Yet the advice is so obvious
that it must have been clear anyway to Rumsfeld and others. Moreover, Kagan’s
admonition is lonely; by including no further call for American concessions to
European views, Kagan in fact challenged Americans to understand Europeans
substantially less than he challenged Europe to understand, and to put up with, the
U.S.24
Finally, Kagan asserted that, compared to Europeans, Americans typically see their
situation as more distant from “the Kantian dream” of a world ruled by reason.
But Kagan did not convincingly explain the relevance of such distance. Disagreement over the world’s place along Kagan’s continuum between the “jungle” and a
more reasoned world need not create disagreement over how to work toward the
latter. Consider domestic use of force against potentially threatening criminals.
There we see a similar disparity between favored U.S. and European strategies:
using lethal force (the death penalty) versus using less drastic options. Analogous
international strategies are the U.S.’s ouster by military force versus the European
ratcheting of legal and diplomatic pressure. The cause of such strategic disparities
22
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need not lie in disagreement over how close we are to a jungle or to a realm of reason. They may lie instead simply in our beliefs about how best to progress toward
a peaceful realm. About this Kagan has little to say.
Nonetheless, Kagan’s analysis also deserves praise, which it likewise is receiving.
One need not agree with it to benefit from examining it closely. Three reasons in
particular suggest that we should debate it thoroughly and candidly, whether or
not we agree with or like it.
First, it describes accurately viewpoints that seem to be widespread in the U.S.
Right or wrong, these are the views Europeans must engage to communicate effectively with many Americans.
Second, we should acknowledge that for most of us Kagan’s message is unpleasant.
Who really wants to view U.S. military attacks as necessary? Who would not prefer
to live in a world where multilateral cooperation prevents and resolves conflict?
This unpleasantness increases the temptation to reject Kagan’s thesis, to blame the
messenger and miss the import and challenge of his message.
Third, Kagan is at least correct to prompt us to move beyond denial and insults as
Americans and Europeans debate strategies for promoting international security.
We must “face the problem head-on,” Kagan wrote,25 and he is right. I commend
Kagan for effectively spreading this challenge far and wide, with a plausible thesis
and hearty grist for the mill of transatlantic debate.
So let us take up Kagan’s challenge. As we do, however, let us show greater willingness than Kagan did to analyze deeply and seriously the European arguments
against U.S. disregard for the United Nations and multilateralism. Let us also ask
more seriously than Kagan did how the U.S. can concretely foster consensusbuilding and even-handed cooperation.
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